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Résumé
Nous décrivons l’utilisation d’un système logique
de raisonnement à partir de données causales et on-
tologiques dans un cadre argumentatif. Les données
consistent en liens causaux ({A1, · · · , An} cause B)
et ontologiques (o1 est_un o2). Le système en déduit
des liens explicatifs possibles ({A1, · · · , An} explique
{B1, · · · , Bm}). Ces liens explicatifs servent ensuite de
base à un système argumentatif qui fournit des expli-
cations possibles. Un exemple inspiré de la tempête
Xynthia, laquelle a provoqué un trop grand nombre de
victimes par rapport aux conditions purement météo-
rologiques, illustre une utilisation de notre système.
Abstract
We investigate an approach to reasoning about
causes through argumentation. We consider a causal
model for a physical system, and look for arguments
about facts. Some arguments are meant to provide
explanations of facts whereas some challenge these
explanations and so on. At the root of argumentation
here, are causal links ({A1, · · · , An} causes B) and
ontological links (o1 is_a o2). We present a system
that provides a candidate explanation ({A1, · · · , An}
explains {B1, · · · , Bm}) by resorting to an underlying
causal link substantiated with appropriate ontological
links. Argumentation is then at work from these various
explaining links. A case study is developed : a severe
storm Xynthia that devastated part of France in 2010,
with an unaccountably high number of casualties.
1 Introduction and Motivation
Looking for explanations is a frequent operation, in va-
rious domains, from judiciary to mechanical fields. We
consider the case where we have some precise (not neces-
sarily exhaustive) description of some mechanism, or si-
tuation, and we are looking for explanations of some facts.
The description contains logical formulas, plus some cau-
sal and ontological formulas (or links). Indeed, it is known
that, while there are similarity between causation and im-
plication, causation cannot be rendered by a simple logical
implication. Also, confusing causation and co-occurrence
could lead to undesirable relationships. This is why we
use here a causal formalism where some causal links and
ontological links are added to classical logical formulas.
Then the causal formalism will produce various explana-
tion links [1]. However, if the situation described is com-
plex enough, this will result in a great number of possible
explanations, and some argumentation is involved in order
to get some reasons to choose between all these candidate
explanations.
In this text, we will consider as an example a severe
storm, called Xynthia, which made 26 deaths in a single
group of houses in La Faute sur Mer, a village in Ven-
dée during a night in February 2010. This was a severe
storm, with strong winds, low pressure, but it had been
forecast. Since the casualties were excessive with respect
to the strength of the meteorological phenomenon, various
investigations have been ordered. This showed that various
factors combined their effects. The weather had its role, ho-
wever, other factors had been involved : recent houses and a
fire station had been constructed in an area known as being
susceptible of getting submerged. Also, the state authori-
ties did not realize that asking people to stay at home was
inappropriate in case of flooding given the traditionally low
Vendée houses.
In this paper, we define in section 2 an enriched causal
model, built from a causal model and an ontological model.
We then show in section 4 how explanations can be derived
from this enriched causal model. We explain in section 5
the use of argumentation in order to deal with the great
number of possible explanations obtained and conclude in
section 6. The Xynthia example, introduced in section 3, is
used as illustration throughout the article.
2 Enriched causal model = Causal mo-
del + ontological model
The model that is used to build tentative explanations
and support argumentation, called the enriched causal mo-
del, is built from a causal model relating literals in cau-
sal links, and from an ontological model where classes
of objects are related through specialization/generalization
links.
2.1 The causal model
By a causal model [8], we mean a representation of a
body of causal relationships to be used to generate argu-
ments that display explanations for a given set of facts.
The basic case is that of a causal link “α causes β” where
α and β are literals. In this basic case, α stands for the
singleton {α} as the general case of a causal link is the
form
{α1, α2, · · · , αn} causes β
where {α1, α2, · · ·αn} is a set (interpreted conjunctively)
of literals.
Part of the causal model for our Xynthia example is gi-
ven in Fig. 2 (each plain black arrow represents a causal
link).
2.2 The ontological model
The literals P (o1, o2, · · · , ok) occurring in the causal
model use some predicates P applied to classes of ob-
jects oi. The ontological model consists of specializa-
tion/generalization links between classes of objects
o1
is-a−→ o2,
where is-a−→ denotes the usual specialization link between
classes. E.g., we have Hurri is-a−→ SWind, House1FPA
is-a−→ HouseFPA and HouseFPA is-a−→ BFPA : a “hur-
ricane” (Hurri) is a specialization of a “strong wing”
(SWind), and the class of “low houses with one level
only in the flood-prone area” (House1FPA) is a specia-
lization of the class of “houses in the flood-prone area”
(HouseFPA), which itself is a specialization of the class
of “buildings in this area” (BFPA). A part of the ontolo-
gical model for our Xynthia example is given in Fig. 1
(each white-headed arrow labelled with is-a represents an
is-a−→ link).
2.3 The enriched causal model
The causal model is extended by resorting to the onto-
logical model, and the result is called the enriched causal
model. The enrichment lies in the so-called ontological de-
duction links (denoted ded ont−→ ) between literals. Such a link
α
ded ont−→ β
simply means that β can be deduced from α due to speciali-
zation/generalization links, the is-a−→ links in the ontological
model, that relate the classes of objects mentioned in α and
β. Note that the relation ded ont−→ is transitive and reflexive.
Here is an easy illustration. A sedan is a kind of car,
which is represented by sedan is-a−→ car in the ontological
model. Then, Iown(sedan) ded ont−→ Iown(car) is an ontolo-
gical deduction link in the enriched model.
Technically, the ded ont−→ links among literals are generated
by means of a single principle as follows. The predicates
used in the causal model are annotated so that each of their
parameters is sorted either as universal or as existential.
A universal parameter of a predicate “inherits” by spe-
cialization, meaning that if the predicate is true on this pa-
rameter then the predicate is also true for specializations
of this parameter. The existential parameters of a predicate
“inherits” by generalization, meaning that if a the predicate
is true on this parameter, then the predicate is also true for
generalizations of this parameter (cf above example of our
owner of a sedan).
As another example, consider the unary predicate
Flooded, where Flooded(o) means that class o (an
area or a group of buildings) is submerged. Its unique
parameter is taken to be “universal” so that if the literal
Flooded(o) is true, then the literal Flooded(s) is also
true whenever s is a specialization of o. The causal model
is enriched by adding Flooded(o) ded ont−→ Flooded(s) for
each class s satisfying s is-a−→ o.
Let us now consider the unary predicate Occurs so
that Occurs(Hurri) intuitively means : some hurricane
occurs. Exactly as above “I own” predicate, this predi-
cate is existential on its unique parameter. By means of
the is-a−→ link Hurri is-a−→ SWind, we obtain the following
ded ont−→ link : Occurs(Hurri) ded ont−→ Occurs(SWind).
Let us provide the formal definition of ded ont−→ links in the
case of unary predicates. Then, the general case is a natural,
but intricate and thus ommitted here, generalization of the
unary case.
Definition 1 Let us suppose that Prop1∃ and Prop2∀ are
two unary predicates, of the “existential kind” for the first
one, and of the “universal kind” for the second one. If in the
ontology is the link class1
is-a−→ class2, then the following
two links are added to the enriched model :
Prop1∃(class1)
ded ont−→ Prop1∃(class2) and
Prop2∀(class2)
ded ont−→ Prop2∀(class1).
In our formalism, causal and ontological links ded ont−→ entail
classical implication :
{α1, · · ·αn} causes α entails (
∧n
i=1αi)→ α.
α
ded ont−→ β entails α→ β. (1)
Ordinary logical formulas are also allowed (for example
for describing exclusions), which are added to the formulas
coming from (1).
When resorting to explanations (see section 4 below),
these ded ont−→ links are extended to sets of literals (links deno-
ted by→ded ontset ) as follows :
Definition 2 Let Φ and Ψ be two sets of literals, we define
Φ →ded ontset Ψ, if for each ψ ∈ Ψ, there exists ϕ ∈ Φ such
that ϕ ded ont−→ ψ (remind that ψ ded ont−→ ψ).
Notice that if a sedan is a kind of car (sedan is-a−→ car),
and Own a predicate existential on its unique argument,
then we get {Iown(sedan), IamHappy} →ded ontset
{Iown(car), IamHappy}, and
{Iown(sedan), IamHappy} →ded ontset {Iown(car)}.
3 The Xynthia example
From various enquiries, including one from the French
parliament 1 and one from the Cours des Comptes 2 and
many articles on the subject, we have many information
about the phenomenon and its dramatic consequences. We
have extracted a small part from all the information as an
illustration of our approach.
The classes we consider in the ontological model and/or
in the causal model are the following ones : Hurri,
SWind, BFPA, House1FPA, HouseFPA, and BFPA
have already been introduced in §2.2, together with a
few is-a−→ links. Among the buildings in the flood-prone
area, there is also a fire station FireSt (remind that
we have also a group of houses HouseFPA, including a
group of typical Vendée low houses with one level only
House1FPA). We consider also three kinds of natural
disasters (NatDis) : Hurri, together with “tsunami”
(Tsun) and “flooding” (Flooding). As far as meteo-
rological phenomena are concerned, we restrict ourselves
to “Very low pressure” (VLPress), together with already
seen Hurri and SWind, and finally we add ‘high spring
tide” (HSTide) to our list of classes.
Two kinds of alerts (Alert) may be given by the
authorities, “Alert-Evacuate” (AlertEvac) and “Alert-
StayAtHome” (AlertStay). We consider also an anemo-
ter (Anemo) able to measure the wind strength and a fact
asserting that “people stay at home” (PeopleStay).
1. http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/
i2697.asp
2. www.ccomptes.fr/Publications/Publications/
Les-enseignements-des-inondations-de-2010-sur
-le-littoral-atlantique-Xynthia-et-dans-le-Var
The following predicates are introduced : (Flooded)
and (Victims_I) applied to a group of building respec-
tively meaning that “flooding” occurs over this group, and
that there were “victims” in this group (I ∈ {1, 2, 3} is
a degree of gravity, e.g. Victims_1, Victims_2 and
Victims_3 respectively mean, in % of the population
of the group : “a small number”, “a significant number”
and “a large number” of victims). OK means that its
unique parameter is in a normal state. Occurs means
that some fact has occurred (a strong wind, a disaster,
. . .), Expected means that some fact is expected to occur.
All these predicates are “universal” on their unique para-
meter, except for the predicates Occurs and Expected
which are “existential”.
Note that negation of a literal is expressed by Neg
as in Neg OK(Anemo) meaning that the anemome-
ter is not in its normal behaviour state (the formula
¬(OK(Anemo) ∧ (NEG OK(anemo)) is thus added).
The classes and the ontological model are given in Fi-
gure 1 with the is-a−→ links represented as white-headed ar-
rows labelled with (is-a).
BFPA
(is−a) (is−a)
FireSt HouseFPA
(is−a)
House1FPA
AlertEvac
(is−a)
Alert
AlertStay
(is−a)(is−a)(is−a)
FloodingTsun Hurri
NatDis
(is−a)
SWind
(is−a)
Anemo
HSTide
PeopleStay
VLPress
FIGURE 1 – Ontological model for Xynthia
Part of the causal model is given in Figure 2 (remember,
black-headed arrows represent causal links). It represents
causal relations between [sets of] literals. It expresses that
an alert occurs when a natural disaster is expected, or when
a natural disaster occurs. Also, people stay at home if
alerted to stay at home, and having one level home flooded
results in many victims, and even more victims if the fire
station itself is flooded,...
From the ontological model and the causal model, the
enriched causal model can be build, adding ded ont−→ links bet-
ween literals when possible.
For instance, for our “existential” predicates, from
Hurri
is-a−→ SWind, the links
Occurs(Hurri)
ded ont−→ Occurs(SWind), and
Expected(Hurri)
ded ont−→ Expected(SWind) are ad-
ded.
In the same way, for a universal predicate,
from House1FPA is-a−→ BFPA, is added the link
Flooded(BFPA)
ded ont−→ Flooded(House1FPA)
Occurs(VLP)
Occurs(SWind)
Occurs(HSTide)
Occurs(Flooding) Flooded(BFPA) Victims_1(BFPA)
Occurs(SWind)
OK(Anemo)
Red(Anemo) Occurs(Hurri)
Expected(NatDis)
Occurs(NatDis)
Occurs(Alert)
Occurs(AlertStay) Occurs(PeopleStay)
Flooded(House1FPA)
Expected(VLPress) Expected(SWind)
Victims_2(House1FPA)
3
Flooded(FireSt)
22Victims_2(House1FPA)
Victims_3(House1FPA)
OK(Anemo) ¬
FIGURE 2 – A part of the causal model for Xynthia
(cf Fig. 6).
Figure 3 represents a part of the enriched causal model,
where the (unlabelled) white-headed arrows represent the
ded ont−→ links and each black-headed arrow represents a causal
link (from a literal or, in case of forked entry, form a set of
literals).
Occurs
(Flooding)
Flooded
(BFPA)
Victims_1
(BFPA)
Flooded
(House1FPA)
(PeopleStay)
Occurs
Flooded
(FireSt)
Victims_3
(House1FPA)
Occurs
(AlertStay)
(House1FPA)
Victims_2
Occurs(VLPress)
Occurs(SWind)
Occurs(HSTide)
FIGURE 3 – Numerous victims in low and flood-prone
houses
4 Explanations
4.1 Explaining a literal from a [set of] literal[s]
Causal and ontological links allow us to infer explana-
tion links. We want to exhibit candidate reasons that can
explain a fact by means of at least one causal link. We dis-
regard explanations that involve only links of the implica-
tional kind. Here is how causal and ontological links are
used in our formalism :
Let Φ denote a set of literals and β be a literal.
The basic case is that Φ causes β
yields that β can be explained by Φ. (2)
The general initial case involves two literals β =
Prop(cl2) and δ = Prop(cl1) built on the same predi-
cate Prop (eventual other parameters equal in these two
literals) :{
Φ causes β
δ
ded ont−→ β
}
yields that
δ can be explained by Φ,
provided δ is possible. (3)
{δ} is the set of justifications for this explanation of δ by Φ.
We require also that the origin of the explanation is
possible, thus the full set of justifications is here the set
Φ ∪ {δ}, while in case of (2), this full set is Φ, even if
no set is given explicitly. Indeed, it is always understood
that the starting point of the explanation link must be
possible, thus we sometimes omit it. Remind that from (1)
we get (
∧
ϕ∈Φ ϕ) → β and δ → β, thus adding β to the
justification set is useless.
An explaining link
Φ can explain α provided Ψ is possible
where Ψ is a set of literals means that
α can be explained by Φ provided the set Φ ∪ Ψ is pos-
sible :
if adding Φ∪Ψ to the available data leads to inconsistency,
then the explanation link cannot be used to explain δ by Φ.
In the figures, white-headed arrows represent “ontologi-
cal links” : ded ont−→ links for bare arrows, and is-a−→ links for
arrows with (is-a) mentioned, while dotted arrows re-
present explanation links (to be read can explain) produced
by these rules, these arrows being sometimes labelled with
the corresponding justification set.
{delta}
beta
delta
Phi beta
delta
Phi
FIGURE 4 – The explanation link from (3) when Φ = {ϕ}
We want also that our explanation links can follow
ded ont−→ links as follows, in the case where Φ = {ϕ} is a sin-
gleton (thus we note sometimes ϕ instead of {ϕ}) :{
ϕ can explain δ provided Ψ is possible
ϕ0
ded ont−→ ϕ δ ded ont−→ δ1
}
yields that ϕ0 can explain δ1 provided Ψ is possible
(4)
{ϕ0} ∪Ψ is the full justification set for this explanation of
δ1 by ϕ0. Again we get ϕ0 → ϕ by (1), so we need not to
mention ϕ here.
delta
delta1
delta
delta1
{delta}
{delta}Phi
Phi0 Phi0
Phi
FIGURE 5 – Explanation links follow ded ont−→ links [cf (4)]
Generalizing the case of (4) when Φ is a set of literals
needs the use of→ded ontset :{
Φ can explain δ provided Ψ is possible
Φ0 →ded ontset Φ δ ded ont−→ δ1
}
yields that Φ0 can explain δ1 provided Ψ is possible
(5)
Now, we also want that our explanation links are tran-
sitive, and this necessitates to be able to explain not only
literals, but sets of literals. Thus we introduce explanation
links among sets of literals, which extend our explanation
links from sets of literals towards literals (since it is an ex-
tension, we can keep the same name explanation link) :
4.2 Explaining a set of literals from a set of lite-
rals
Definition 3 Let n be some natural integer, and, for
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} Φ,Ψi be sets of literals and δi
be literals. If, for each i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, we have
Φ can explain δi provided Ψi is possible,
then we define the following [set] explanation link
Φ can explain {δi/i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}}
provided
⋃n
i=1 Ψi is possible.
Again, such an explanation link applies only when its
(full) justification set, here Φ ∪ ⋃ni=1 Ψi, is possible (not
contradicted by the data).
Notice that we do not want to explain Φ by Φ itself, and
we extend this restriction to→ded ontset links :
We do not want to explain Φ by Φ0 is all we know is
Φ0 →ded ontset Φ. Indeed, this seems to be cheating about what
an explanation is (we want some causal information to play
a role).
However, in the line of (5), we want that explanations
follow→ded ontset links, thus we introduce the following defini-
tion :
Definition 4 If we have{
Φ can explain ∆ provided Ψ is possible
Φ0 →ded ontset Φ ∆→ded ontset ∆1
}
then we have
Φ0 can explain ∆1 provided Ψ is possible
Again, the full justification set of the resulting explaining
link is Φ0 ∪Ψ.
Our last definition of [set] explanation links concerns
transitivity of explanations. This is a “weak” transitivity
since the justifications are gathered, however, we will call
this property “transitivity”. We need to be able to omit in
the resulting link the part of the intermediate set which is
already explained in the first explanation giving rise to a
transitive link :
Definition 5 If{
Φ can explain ∆1 ∪∆2 provided Ψ1 is possible and
Γ ∪∆2 can explain Θ provided Ψ2 is possible,
}
then Φ ∪ Γ can explain ∆1 ∪∆2 ∪Θ
provided Ψ1 ∪Ψ2 is possible.
Again, the full justification set is Φ ∪ Γ ∪Ψ1 ∪Ψ2.
4.3 About explanation links and arguments
As a small example, let us suppose that in the causal
model is the link
reason causes Prop∃(class2)
and that in the ontology are the links :
class1
is-a−→ class2
class1
is-a−→ class3
Resulting are the next two links in the enriched model :
Prop∃(class1)
ded ont−→ Prop∃(class2)
Prop∃(class1)
ded ont−→ Prop∃(class3)
By pattern matching over the diagrams in Fig. 4 and 5
[cf patterns (3) and (5], we get
reason can explain Prop∃(class3) throughProp∃(class1)
(“justification”).
Importantly, it is assumed that the causal link is expressed
on the appropriate level : in other words, should there be
some doubts about the kind of objects (here class2) that
enjoy Prop∃ due to reason, the causal link would be about
another class.
The proviso accompanying the explanation takes place
at the level of justifications : the candidate explanation is
worth inasmuch as Prop∃(class1) is not contradicted. In
particular it must be consistent with the reason causing
Prop∃(class3) [remind (1)].
Here is an example from Xynthia data. Consider the cau-
sal link
Expected(V LPress) causes Expected(SWind)
together with the following ontological links{
Hurri
is-a−→ SWind
Hurri
is-a−→ NatDis.
}
The links below can be obtained in the enriched model{
Expected(Hurri)
ded ont−→ Expected(SWind)
Expected(Hurri)
ded ont−→ Expected(NatDis)
}
We get an argument to the effect that from the set of
data Θ =
Expected(V LPress) causes Expected(SWind)
Expected(Hurri)
ded ont−→ Expected(StrW )
Expected(Hurri)
ded ont−→ Expected(NatDis)

we obtain : Θ yields that
Expected(V LPress) can explain
Expected(NatDis) provided Expected(Hurri) is
possible.
The intuition is that, from these data, it is reasonable
to explainExpected(NatDis), byExpected(V LPress),
provided Expected(Hurri) is possible (not contradicted
by other data).
4.4 An example of compound explanations
Figure 6 displays an example from Xynthia (cf also
Fig. 3) of a few possible explanations, represented by
dotted lines, with their label such as 1 or 1a. The sets
of literals, from which the explaining links start, are
framed and numbered from (1) to (5). This shows tran-
sitivity of explanations at work : e.g. set 1 can explain
Victims_1(BFPA) (explanation link labelled 1+1a+1b)
uses explanation links 1, 1a and 1b.
Another example is
set 5 can explain Victims_3(House1FPA) (expla-
nation link 1+1a+2+3) :
explanations 1, 1a, 2 and 3 are at work here, and link 2 uses
links 1 and 1a together with
Flooded(BFPA)
ded ont−→ Flooded(House1FPA)
while explanation 3 comes from links 1+1a together with
Flooded(BFPA)
ded ont−→ Flooded(FireSt).
(1)
(3)
Occurs(AlertStay)
Occurs(VLPress)
Occurs(SWind)
Occurs(HSTide)
(2)
Occurs(PeopleStay)
Flooded(House1FPA)
2
Occurs(Flooding) Flooded Victims_1
Victims_2(House1FPA)
1
1+1a
1a 1b
1+1a+1b
(4)
Occurs(VLPress)
Occurs(StWind)
Occurs(HSTide)
Occurs(AlertStay)
Flooded(FireSt)(5)
3Flooded(FireSt)
Victims_3(House1FPA)Victims_2(House1FPA)
1+1a+2+3
1+1a+2
(BFPA)(BFPA)
(bis)
FIGURE 6 – A few explanations for victims
5 Argumentation
As just seen, the enriched causal graph allows us to infer
explanations for assertions and these explanations might be
used in an argumentative context [2, 3]. Let us first provide
some motivation from our example.
A possible set of explanations for the flooded buildings
is constituted by the bad weather conditions (“very low
pressure” and “strong wind”) together with “high spring
tide” (see Fig. 2). Given this explanation (argument), it is
possible to attack it by noticing : a strong wind is supposed
to trigger the red alarm of my anemometer and I did not
get any alarm. However, this counter-argument may itself
be attacked by remarking that, in the case of a hurricane,
that is a kind of strong wind, an anemometer is no longer
operating, which can explain that a red alarm cannot be ob-
served.
Let us see how to consider formally argumentation when
relying on an enriched causal model and explanations as
described in sections 2 and 4. Of course, we begin with
introducing arguments, as follows.
Argument : That
“Φ can explain γ in view of Θ, provided δ is possible”
is formalized here as an argument whenever (3) holds, that
is :
Θ yields that γ can be explained by Φ, provided δ is
possible.
The components of an argument consist of :
– Φ, the explanation, a set of literals.
– γ, the statement being explained, a literal.
– ∆, the justification of the explanation (see Section 4),
a set of literals.
– Θ, the evidence, comprised of propositions (e.g.,(∧
Φ
)→ γ), causal links
(e.g., Φ causes β), and ontological deduction links
(e.g., δ ded ont−→ β).
Here is an illustration from the Xynthia event. From
Fig. 2, that the BFPA buildings are flooded can be
explained via the set of two causal links
Θ = { Occurs(Flooding) causes F looded(BFPA),Occurs(V LPress)Occurs(SWind)
Occurs(HSTide)
 causes Occurs(Flooding) }
More precisely, using the basic case (2) twice, we ob-
tain that Flooded(BFPA) can be explained by the set of
literals
Φ =
 Occurs(V LPress)Occurs(SWind)
Occurs(HSTide)

The corresponding argument is
Θ yields that γ can be explained by Φ, provided ∆ is
possible
where
– The explanation is Φ.
– The statement being explained is γ =
Flooded(BFPA).
– The justification of the explanation is empty.
– The evidence is Θ.
5.1 Counter-arguments
Generally speaking, an argument “Φ can explain γ in
view of Θ, provided ∆ is possible” is challenged by any
statement which questions
1. either Φ (e.g., an argument exhibiting an explanation
for the negation of
∧
Φ)
2. or γ (e.g., an argument exhibiting an explanation for
the negation of γ)
3. or ∆ (e.g., an argument exhibiting an explanation for
the negation of
∧
∆)
4. or any item in Θ (e.g., an argument exhibiting an ex-
planation for the negation of Θ for some θ occurring
in Θ)
5. or does so by refutation : using any of Φ, Θ, ∆ and γ
to explain some falsehood.
Such objections are counter-arguments (they have the form
of an argument : they explain something –but what they
explain contradicts something in the challenged argument).
Dispute. Let us consider the illustration at the start
of this section : The argument (that the buildings in the
flood-prone area are flooded can be explained, partly, by
a strong wind) is under attack on the grounds that my
anemometer did not turn red –indicating that no strong
wind occurred. The latter is a counter-argument of type
5 in above list. Indeed, the statement to be explained
by the counter-argument is the falsehood Red(anemo)
(e.g., Green(Anemo) has been observed), using SWind,
i.e., an item in the explanation in the attacked argument.
Remember, the attacked argument is
Θ yields that Flooded(BFPA) can be explained by Occurs(V LPress)Occurs(SWind)
Occurs(HSTide)

Taking Red(Anemo) to be a falsehood, the counter-
argument at hand is
Θ’ yields that Red(anemo) can be explained by{
Occurs(SWind)
OK(Anemo)
}
where
– The explanation is
Φ′ = {Occurs(SWind), OK(Anemo)}.
– The statement being explained is γ′ = Red(Anemo).
– The evidence is Θ′ ={{
Occurs(SWind)
OK(Anemo)
}
causes Red(anemo)
}
In our illustration, this counter-argument has in turn a
counter-argument (of type 1.) explaining why the anemo-
meter did not get red : i.e., explaining the negation of an
item (OK(Anemo) is the item in question) in the expla-
nation in the counter-argument. So, the counter-counter-
argument here is : Θ” yields that
¬OK(Anemo) can be explained by { Occurs(Hurri) }
where
– The explanation is Φ′′ = {Occurs(Hurri)}.
– The statement being explained is
γ′′ = ¬OK(Anemo).
– The evidence is
Θ′′ = {Occurs(Hurri) causes ¬OK(Anemo)}
The dispute can extend to a counter-counter-counter-
argument and so on as the process iterates.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this work is to study the link between causes
and explanations [5, 6], and to rely on explanations in an
argumentative context [2].
In a first part, we define explanations as resulting from
both causal and ontological links. An enriched causal mo-
del is built from a causal model and an ontology, from
which the explaining links are derived (cf e.g. Fig4 and
(2). Our work differs from other approaches in the litera-
ture in that it strictly separates causality, ontology and ex-
planations, while considering that ontology is key in gene-
rating sensible explanations from causal statements. Note
however that some authors have already introduced onto-
logy to be used for problem solving tasks as planning [7,
Chapter 2] and more recently for diagnosis and repair [9].
We then argue that these causal explanations are interesting
building blocks to be used in an argumentative context.
Although explanation and argumentation have long been
identified as distinct processes [10], it is also recognized
that the distinction is a matter of context, hence they both
play a role [4] when it comes to eliciting an answer to a
“why” question. This is exactly what is attempted in this
paper, as we are providing “possible” explanations, that
thus can be turned into arguments. The argument format
has some advantages inasmuch as its uniformity allows us
to express objection in an iterated way : “possible” expla-
nations are challenged by counter-arguments that happen
to represent rival, or incompatible, “possible” explanations.
However, a lot remains to be done. Among others, compa-
ring competing explanations according to minimality, pre-
ferences, and generally a host of criteria.
We have designed a system in answer set programming
that implements most of the explicative proposal introdu-
ced above. We plan to include it in an argumentative fra-
mework and think it will a good basis for a really practical
system, able to manage with a as rich and tricky example
as the full Xinthia example.
Références
[1] Philippe Besnard, Marie-Odile Cordier, and Yves
Moinard. Ontology-based inference for causal ex-
planation. Integrated Computer-Aided Engineering,
15 :351–367, 2008.
[2] Philippe Besnard and Anthony Hunter. Elements of
Argumentation. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2008.
[3] Phan Minh Dung. On the acceptability of arguments
and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning,
logic programming and n-person games. Artificial In-
telligence, 77 :321–357, 1995.
[4] Justin Scott Giboney, Susan Brown, and Jay F. Nuna-
maker Jr. User acceptance of knowledge-based sys-
tem recommendations : Explanations, arguments, and
fit. In 45th Annual Hawaii International Conference
on System Sciences (HICSS’45), pages 3719–3727.
IEEE Computer Society, 2012.
[5] Joseph Halpern and Judea Pearl. Causes and Explana-
tions : A Structural-Model Approach. Part I : Causes.
In Jack S. Breese and Daphne Koller, editors, 17th
Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
(UAI’01), pages 194–202. Morgan Kaufmann, 2001.
[6] Joseph Y. Halpern and Judea Pearl. Causes and Ex-
planations : A Structural-Model Approach. Part II :
Explanations. In Bernhard Nebel, editor, 17th Inter-
national Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(IJCAI’01), pages 27–34. Morgan Kaufmann, 2001.
[7] Henry Kautz. Reasoning about plans. In James F.
Allen, Henry A. Kautz, Richard N. Pelavin, and Jo-
shua D. Tennenberg, editors, Reasoning About Plans,
chapter A Formal Theory of Plan Recognition and its
Implementation, pages 69–126. Morgan Kaufmann,
1991.
[8] Dov Hugh Mellor. The Facts of Causation. Rout-
ledge, London, 1995.
[9] Gianluca Torta, Daniele Theseider Dupré, and Luca
Anselma. Hypothesis discrimination with abstrac-
tions based on observation and action costs. In Alban
Grastien and Markus Strumpter, editors, 19th Work-
shop on Principles of Diagnosis (DX’08), pages 189–
196, Blue Mountains, NSW, Australia, 2008.
[10] Douglas Walton. Explanations and arguments based
on practical reasoning. In Thomas Roth-Berghofer,
Nava Tintarev, and David B. Leake, editors, Work-
shop on Explanation-Aware Computing at IJCAI’09,
pages 72–83, Pasadena, CA, U.S.A., July 2009.
